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Taking Dispute Resolution Theory

Seriously at Home and Abroad:
Prospects and Limitations
Bryant G.Garth*
Carrie Menkel-Meadow's splendid discussion of dispute resolution theory
operates at several levels.' One level involves a questioning of the international
applicability of U.S. dispute resolution theory. She shows that our theory is in
many respects parochial-not necessarily capable of explaining or even contributing to shaping dispute resolution behavior outside the United States. For the theory to make any claim to universality, she suggests, it must take into account very
different settings and perhaps even develop counter models applicable to some
places but not others. A more context sensitive theory, she argues, can move us
beyund concepts and approaches uncritically derived from U.S.-oriented assumptions about the interests and behaviors of parties to a dispute. The article deserves
a very careful reading for these and other insights about the current state of dispute resolution theory in the United States and its potential relationship to dispute
processes found abroad or in transnational contexts.
There is also a kind of lament and research project connected to the concern
with the potential universality of dispute resolution theory. The implicit lament is
that, while the theory may not be perfect, it does offer insights that can prevent
and mitigate conflict in many cases. With the war in Iraq looming at the time of
her writing, Professor Menkel-Meadow naturally wondered what dispute resolution theory and its progress meant as a practical matter in the face of the logic-or
lack thereof-that propelled the United States toward the war. She suggests, for
example, that policymakers and leaders-including those who negotiated with
Iraq-have not really assimilated the "teachings of our field.",2 If they had, perhaps the war and any potential threat posed by Iraq, might have been avoided.
This implicit lament can be stated more generally. In Professor MenkelMeadow's words, "the techniques, technology, and apparatus of conflict resolution 'processes' are much more professionalized and developed in domestic dispute resolution" than abroad or in transnational situations. 3 Even in the domestic
setting, however, there are places where the theory ought to, but does not, play
any role. Again, in her words:

* Bryant G. Garth is director of the American Bar Foundation (ABF). Prior to coming to the ABF
in 1990, he was dean of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. His degrees are from Yale
(B.A. 1972), Stanford Law School (J.D. 1975), and the European University Institute in Florence
(Ph.D. 1979).
I. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessonsfrom General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J.DISP. RESOL. 319.

2. Id. at 327.
3. Id. at 336.
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[I]ncreasingly, retired judges, elder statesmen, and other "notables" engage in shuttle diplomacy to settle major class action lawsuits, community disputes, and in the case of some politicians, like Jesse Jackson or
Jimmy Carter, may intervene in international disputes without formal
portfolio, authority, or training.4
Similarly,
With the sophisticated debates about "evaluative" vs. "facilitative" mediation and whether "neutrality," "embedded expertise," or legal training
is required of third party neutrals (whether mediators, arbitrators, facilitators or leaders of public policy consensus processes), the "professionalization" of the role of the third party has led to a robust set of issues for
consideration in the practice of third party intervention. In the international arena, by contrast, although there are many sophisticated practitioners with diplomatic portfolios, other qualifications such as education,
training on issues of neutrality, practice protocols, and ethics, seem relatively newer and underdeveloped. 5
This implicit lament is also a research question. Put simply, the question is
why and when do the practitioners nationally and internationally come to use dispute resolution theory in their approaches to particular disputes. Drawing in part
on some suggestions in her article, I want to explore some aspects of this research
question and suggest some expansion of the theory to explore this question more
systematically.
One place to start is with the relationship of the law to dispute resolution theory. Dispute resolution theory purports to apply whether the law is involved or
not, but Professor Menkel-Meadow notes that the relationship between the law
and the theory is more complex. Indeed, she suggests that as part of our research
we should develop "'maps' of the regime (or absences) of law and legal institutions standing as 'back-ups' to the negotiation and mediative processes currently
being described." 6 Comparative work needs to be aware of the place of law.
Later in the article, Professor Menkel-Meadow also raises and discusses the question of the impact of the "rule of law" domestically and internationally: "Does the
ultimate sanction of 'the rule of law' or court decision affect domestic dispute
resolution differently than 'violence' or economic sanctions affect international
disputes?" 7 The theory, in short, must take into account different positions of law.
I believe the relationship is even stronger than she posits, as a practical matter.
The place of law in any given context is central to the spread of dispute resolution
theory and to the ADR practices associated with that theory. The place of law can
be seen through an examination of the processes promoting the spread of dispute
resolution theory.

4. Id. at
5. Id. at
6. Id. at
7. Id. at

337-38.
347 (citations omitted).
335.
349.
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It would be relatively easy to argue that the dispute resolution theory, almost
by definition, should make sense only for the United States. It was developed in
response to particular U.S. problems and came to U.S. law schools because of the
role of law and litigation in U.S. social and economic life. Whatever we think
about the origins and potential local biases of the theory, however, there are also
potential competitive advantages for U.S. dispute resolution theory abroad. It
does have some potential as an export. We can see this potential by considering
the export of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy produced initially in the 1950s at the
University of Chicago, for example, which was built on theories of monetary policy derived from U.S. economic history. Nevertheless, these economic theories
became universal enough to provide the recipes for economic reform in much of
the world in the 1980s.8 One of the reasons for this diffusion of ideas is that the
prestige of the U.S. universities abroad, combined with U.S.-provided scholarships, attracted talented and ambitious students to the universities and the ideas.
The students learned U.S. economics, applied that learning in places like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and also took that learning back home. Once at home, the students naturally invested their own expertise
into their local contexts.9
The question is whether similar dynamics will apply to U.S. dispute resolution theory. There are reasons to expect the same diffusion of ideas. In particular,
in contrast to the situation a generation ago with U.S. economic theory, law
graduates and others from around the world come to the United States in rather
large numbers to seek graduate degrees and take advantage of other learning programs. Here they become quite familiar with the tenets of U.S. dispute resolution
theory because that theory has come to occupy a very strong place in U.S law
schools. These students from abroad may not question the theory as much as they
should, but the point is that it has a strong appeal.
For example, the mandatory mediation program enacted into law in Argentina
in the early 1990s was a direct result of the work of two judges who attended dis-0
pute resolution programs at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada.'
Similarly, a young Chilean lawyer in the late 1990s stated that in the midst of a
negotiation with another young Chilean lawyer, one said to the other: "Harvard
Negotiation Project, when were you there?"" They each recognized the vocabulary and negotiation approach that the other had learned at Harvard. Chilean and
Argentinian law schools, especially the major public ones, remain relatively formal, but many individuals are taking the prestige and credibility of the U.S. theory
and using it in their own local contexts. Lawyers and judges use the theory as a
basis to argue for reform in the judiciary and in legal procedures.
These importers can, of course, be criticized locally for promoting a foreignbased expertise, but efforts to make dispute resolution theory in the United States
8. See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS:

THE BATTLE

BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998).

9. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
143-44 (2002).
10. Id. at 242-45.

LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES

11. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, CHILE: LAW AND THE LEGITIMATION OF TRANSITIONS.
FROM THE PATRIMONIAL STATE TO THE INTERNATIONAL NEO-LIBERAL STATE 81 (Am. B. Found.,

Working Paper No. 9709, 1998).
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more open and aware of other places and processes will make it easier to combat
such charges. In any event, there is momentum behind dispute resolution theory
and processes that can be traced into other continents, as well as transnational
arenas such as international commercial arbitration. That does not mean, of
course, that the theory's impact in different arenas and settings will be the same as
in the United States, but it has the capacity to provide the standard by which local
and transnational practices are measured.
Therefore, it is possible to imagine a cadre of young professionals personally
investing in dispute resolution theory and then taking it into new places and substantive areas. Professor Menkel-Meadow makes the point that the theory ought
to be good enough to merit such universalization. 2 Although that is correct, the
process of importing and exporting can continue indefinitely even if the theory
might be considered flawed and parochial.
Professor Menkel-Meadow's observations about the relationship between
dispute resolution and the law highlight the potential importance of legal sanctions
backing up mediation processes. She contrasts the field of international relations,
which, at this point, is not very "legalized," with U.S. domestic dispute resolution.13 Another way to ask the question of the relationship between law and dispute resolution theory, however, is to ask who the carriers of that theory will be:
who will learn it in the first place, who will try to put it into practice in new domains, and what strategies will be available to generate a demand for the new
technologies. In my experience to date, as the preceding paragraphs suggest, the
international carriers of dispute resolution theory have been lawyers, and their
preferred method for building demand for their dispute resolution processes has
been to enact court-annexed mediation programs (e.g., Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Argentina). From this perspective, the "law" has been crucial to the spread of dispute resolution theory outside the United States and into other settings.
The same process can be seen in international commercial arbitration, where a
number of arbitrators and practitioners have led the charge to bring U.S.-style
mediation (and the theories that go with it) into international commercial arbitration. As Yves Dezalay and I suggested in our book several years ago, the relatively younger and more U.S.-oriented generation promoted their position against
the "grand old men" by asserting their superiority in technical mattersl 4 -their
"professionalization" in the words of Professor Menkel-Meadow. Dispute resolution theory fits their orientation both to the United States and to technical
sophistication.
It is not difficult to imagine a course of events whereby law graduates, foreign and domestic, of U.S. law schools and other programs learn dispute resolution theory and bring it back into their own countries and practices. It provides a
way for them to assert their expertise and ability to handle disputes efficiently and
effectively. Increasingly, we could also see greater numbers of international conferences where dispute resolution theories are debated, modified, and made more
universal in their applicability and theoretical concerns.
12. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 349-52.
13. Id. at 329-36.
14. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING

IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

(1996) [hereinafter

DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE].
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Before suggesting that such developments will necessarily occur, it is important to revisit the link between dispute resolution theory and the law. For most
legal scholars in the United States, it is almost axiomatic that disputants will turn
to the law and legal machinery to handle their problems. Law is considered the
default mode. This assumption may not be warranted in many instances, but it
accurately reflects the strong position of law in the United States, compared to its
position in other countries. In contrast, other forms of authority and legitimacy
outside of the United States compete with and often dominate the law. The authority might be that of religion, family, political party, or state power. Those
who resolve disputes bring their authority to the table and use it to find a resolution that draws on, or is consistent with, some plausible interpretation of the
dominant texts or understandings, and the legitimacy of that interpretation persuades the parties to submit. Law must compete for that position of authority and
legitimacy.
The increase in global trade and communication, the growth of transnational
law firms and local corporate law firms, the increased numbers of non-U.S. residents seeking U.S. law degrees, and the activities of development institutions,
including the IMF and the World Bank, are promoting the idea of the "rule of
law" and an increased prominence to law and legal institutions in dispute resolution. 15 The process is slow and the results far from inevitable, but the point is that
the success or failure of dispute resolution theory depends ultimately on a process
that not only trains law graduates from foreign countries in the U.S. technology
but also gives them some power and prestige to apply their acquired knowledge in
dispute resolution at home. If their credentials and training gain little recognition
at home, their expertise will also not be taken very seriously.
The same basic insights about the role of law and competing forms of authority apply to Professor Menkel-Meadow's implicit lament. Professor MenkelMeadow notes several times, as quoted above, that "notables," including diplomats and retired judges, have not fully embraced the importance of knowing, understanding, or implementing dispute resolution theory. Yet, the "amateurs" continue to play a very large role in high stakes dispute resolution in business, including international commercial arbitration, and in international relations. Will these
notable amateurs learn dispute resolution theory and apply that theory for the
benefit of the parties to a dispute? Will the cadre of graduates armed with cutting
notable amateurs who still
edge theory finally transform the approaches of these
16
dominate high stakes disputes at home and abroad?
We should begin by noting that the amateurs typically have at least one recognized expertise for dispute resolution, the law. Yet, as Professor MenkelMeadow understands, the amateurs do not invest very much of their legal expertise in resolving the dispute. One of the leading international commercial arbitra7
for example, stated that the
tors and an expert in the so-called Lex Mercatoria,1
Lex Mercatoria could always be interpreted to find the correct business resolu-

15. 1d.
16. See Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12
OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 37 (1996).
17. See generally LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION:
MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).

A DIscussioN OF THE NEW LAW
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tion.18 It was not that the legal expertise dictated the result, but that the appropriate result was found to be consistent with the Lex Mercatoria. This "reasonableness" aspect to dispute resolution helps explain why high stakes disputes are typically handled by these amateurs rather than the learned "experts" in dispute resolution theory. The logic of this apparent paradox (amateurs thrive by providing
legal results that are dictated largely by an economic logic) merits some elaboration.
The paradox is a result of the need to create a demand for law as the legitimating authority for dispute resolution. The demand, as I have noted, is not inevitable, and we can see the need to build that demand in the history of international
commercial arbitration. Business disputes are now routinely submitted to international commercial arbitration, but that was not always the case. It was necessary
for the potential arbitrators to demonstrate to businesses that they should substitute a legally-oriented arbitration for negotiation handled under the shadow of
diplomacy, economic coercion, and pressures to maintain the working relationship. What that meant was that the lawyers, and the law they promoted, had to be
generally brought into alignment with prevailing understandings of political and
economic power.
As with respect to any legitimating ideology and set of institutions used to
decide or resolve a dispute, those who hold economic and political power will
submit to a decision only if they feel that it serves their long-term interests. The
holders of economic power tend to submit to the law because it protects their
property and allows them to enforce contracts that reflect their economic power.
They may lose cases from time to time-or negotiate settlements that give up
something of substance-but the system provides the huge benefit of legitimating
and protecting their power.
There is another aspect to the willingness to submit to authority, legal or otherwise. There are often many ways that a dispute can be handled that will be
more or less consistent with the prevailing rules. Those who submit their disputes
to a particular authority and set of institutions-and have choices of where to take
the dispute-want some assurance that the result will be something with which
they can live. The assurance might come through confidence that the person
charged with resolving the dispute is well-trained and an expert in the relevant
technology, such as having expertise in the law or in dispute resolution theory. It
might also come from the position of the person resolving the dispute, such as a
retired judge, notable academic, or former government official. For high stakes
disputes, in particular, our research strongly suggests that the parties with power
will seek to entrust their dispute to someone in whom they have confidence borne
of personal experience. They want to know that the individual will understand
subtle issues of power, know what kinds of outcomes are plausible (and acceptable) and which ones are not, and have an ability to rationalize that outcome in the
relevant legitimating language (which might be law). In addition, for transnational disputes, the parties want to be sure that the individual is not too connected
with one state or its businesses. The individual third party must, in other words,
be sufficiently cosmopolitan.

18. DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 14.
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The potential number of individuals who might fit the bill for high stakes national and transnational disputes is relatively small, but the actual number of individuals who handle the disputes is much smaller still. One reason is that the lawyers or other agents who pick the third parties must be able to tell their clients that
they have picked the best person available. If, by chance, the client does not like
the results, the lawyer or agent can say that it was the product of the best choice
possible. The process of selecting third parties then tends to reward those who are
already well known, and makes it difficult for outsiders to gain a portfolio of cases
to resolve.
The question behind Professor Menkel-Meadow's lament then is whether the
notables of dispute resolution will be persuaded to embrace dispute resolution
theory as a guide to the processes in which they serve, or whether they will make
places for other experts in that field. The starting point is that the demand for
third parties for high stakes or sensitive disputes is driven more by the people than
by the expertise. The ticket for admission into the club of high profile dispute
resolvers is the combination of a distinguished name and an earned reputation for
sensitivity in handling highly charged or high stakes disputes. 19 Even though most
arbitrators and representatives in arbitration are lawyers, they are not necessarily
adversarial. They are skilled in reducing conflict even when they have stirred it
up themselves. There is some competition within the group of individuals in this
elite club, but the competition is not such that outsiders are welcome based on
superior expertise. As with many monopoly, or quasi-monopoly, situations, there
is no great pressure to innovate. The elite group, in my experience, will address
the dispute resolution theory at their own conferences and in their publications,
but they will only use what they choose to apply; true experts in dispute resolution
theory will not be in the position to assess the uses of the theories. From the perspective of an expert such as Professor Menkel-Meadow, in fact, it will probably
appear as if the theories do not have influence on the amateurs.
Will the amateurs ever truly embrace dispute resolution theory in their practices? As those trained in the United States grow older and become notables
themselves, perhaps, the theory will gain a stronger place. However, the selection
of individuals for the high stakes disputes will never be based on their theoretical
sophistication. Instead, those who make the selection will continue to choose
individuals who have personal access to the reputations for discretion and responsibility of the potential third parties. My conclusion, therefore, is that the theory
will gain adherents for high stakes claims at home and abroad, but that the actual
role of dispute resolution theory will remain relatively small. Put another way,
here, as in many areas of the "law," personal relations are more important than
knowledge of legal theory. As academics, for example, we may think that law
firms are above all collections of legal experts. What clients look for, however, is
not just expertise, but personal connections and contacts that can help clients accomplish their goals under a respectable legal umbrella.
I would like to see contributions to dispute resolution theory that examine
what third parties bring to the table, in relation to their legal expertise or sophistication in dispute resolution theory. Much of the theory reads as if it is simply a
technology that anyone can apply. The analogue in the law more generally is the
19. Id.
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assumption in the legal academy that only the legal argument counts, not who
makes the argument. Even in the United States, the success or failure of legal
arguments and dispute resolution processes, at certain levels, depends on factors
other than expertise. I think that most practitioners recognize this fact, but I do
not think that academic theories have accepted this insight. Professor MenkelMeadow is correct to dramatize the contrast between amateurs and dispute resolution "professionals," and to lament the amateurs ignorance of the dispute resolution technology known to and utilized by the professionals. But we also need a
theory that explains what processes, techniques, and technology different kinds of
amateurs have and use in different settings.
There is one final point to make about the demand for the law and dispute
resolution theories. As noted before, the willingness to entrust a dispute to a third
party depends on a calculation about the risks and benefits of submission of the
dispute. There are ways, as I have suggested, to minimize that risk when the
stakes are high, including the entrustment only to third parties who are known and
trusted to behave responsibly-meaning that they also behave with a recognition
of the parties' powers and positions. When the stakes are relatively small, it may
be sufficient simply to entrust the dispute to the legal system or someone theoretically sophisticated. There are issues involved in the assignment of disputes to one
or another forum.20 A key component to any process, however, is that the benefit
sought by the more powerful party is more than an outcome that favors that party.
Much of the time the favorable outcome could have been obtainable simply
through the use of superior economic or political power. Powerful parties who
submit to legal processes also seek the legitimacy that comes from following an
acceptable process and set of governing rules. Submitting to a legitimate process
always runs some risk, even though the rules tend to be generally in alignment
with economic and political power. The demands of the more powerful party may
be questioned or modified, or perhaps even rejected in some instances.
We come now to the war in Iraq. Professor Menkel-Meadow wondered why
there was not more investment in dispute resolution. Perhaps the failure of negotiation represented the extreme version of the powerful party anxious to avoid the
questioning of its goals and actions. It may be that the U.S. government, led by
President George W. Bush, simply did not want to run any risk that there would
be an outcome or potential outcome inconsistent with victory on their terms. Put
another way, the ever more super-powerful party did not believe that the potential
gains in legitimacy were worth the potential costs. I am not sure that further developments in dispute resolution theory will help solve this kind of situation, but it
is worth-while to consider what could have resulted by using a strategy more dependent on legitimacy. Maybe an investment in legitimacy might have precluded
some U.S. options, but the benefits from that investment may not have been sufficiently appreciated.
Professor Menkel-Meadow reminds us of the progress of dispute resolution
theory in the legal academy in the past several decades. It is fascinating to see the
way students from abroad embrace the theory and seek to apply it in their own
settings. There is strong momentum for U.S. dispute resolution theory abroad, but
20. 1 explored this problem in part in Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as
Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927 (2002).
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it is coming in behind U.S. law. The theory must be strengthened and made more
relevant to different settings and persons. That is a key point of Professor Menkel-Meadow's article, but the theory may spread in any event. The power and
prestige of U.S. law abroad, however, will also depend on the position it occupies
at home. Law depends on a willingness to give up some power in order to gain
legitimacy. Since September It, 2001, the willingness of the executive branch to
trade power for legitimacy has diminished considerably at home and abroad. At
the core of Professor Menkel-Meadow's lament, therefore, is a concern and desire
to find dispute resolution approaches and processes that will bring dignity and
potential benefits to both weak and strong parties. We continue to search for such
processes and to encourage powerful parties to find it in their interests to adopt
them.
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